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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JOHN D. MARSHALL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
7407

THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The parties will be referred to as in the court below,
plaintiff and defendant. All italics are ours.
The first trial of this case was before the Honorable
John A. Hendricks, sitting with a jury, and the trial started
July 1, 1948. This trial resulted in a verdict in favor of
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the plaintiff and against the defendant awarding the plaintiff $500.00 special damages and $8,000.00 general damages
( R. 17 4, 17 5) . Thereafter defendant filed its motion for
a new trial setting forth all the statutory grounds (R. 037),
which motion was on August 28, 1948, granted by the
I
court (R. 038). A second trial before the Honorable L.
Leland Larsen, sitting with a jury, was had beginning
February 23, 1949, and resulted in a verdict in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff "no cause of action"
( R. 07 4) . The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for a
new trial, which was denied April 22, 1949 (R. 144).
_,1

l

The plaintiff has assigned as error the court's granting defendant's motion for a new trial following the first
trial of the case, and has assigned as error the granting
and the refusal of certain instructions at the second trial.
It therefore seems advisable, inasmuch as respondent does
not agree with the appellant's statement of facts, to make
a separate statement of facts as to each trial.
B.

STATEMENT OF

F~CTS

(FIRST TRIAL)

All references to the record are to the transcript of
the testimony of the first trial unless otherwise indicated.
In granting defendant's motion for a new trial the
Honorable John A. Hendricks made and entered the following written order :
"After studying the affidavits and transcribed
testimony of the plaintiff, and taking into consideration the emphasis that plaintiff's counsel put on the
defendant's (sic) confinement for two weeks in the
hospital, the court is of the opinion that the jury
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was influenced to the extent that they undoubtedly
allowed excessive special damages, and also probably
caused to a'ward general damages in excess of what
they would have awarded had they known the facts
about his stay in the hospital in May. It is therefore ordered that a new trial be granted."
(R. 038)
The language of the above quoted order does not
in itself entirely suggest the harm to the defendant and the

injustice perpetrated upon the court and jury alike by the
matters therein referred to.
Plaintiff in his complaint sought damages in the sum
of $30,000.00, alleging that since the 19th day of June, 1947
he had been constantly under the care of doctors, and alleged on information and belief that he had been permanently injured (R. 004) The jury was fully advised of plaintiff's claims in the instructions, not only as to the amount
I
demanded but the claimed permanency of plaintiff's injuries and the claimed loss of future earnings on account
thereof (See Court's Instruction No. 11, R. 067). The facts
disclosed that the accident occurred on the morning of June
19, 1947, at about 9:00 A. M. at the passenger station at
Ogden, Utah. Following the accident the plaintiff walked
up town in Ogden to see a company doctor and after being
hospitalized for two days returned to his home in Oakland,
California (R. 15). Upon returning to his home he entered
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company's hospital in San
Francisco, where he was confined for one week and was an
out patient an additional 37 days, or under treatment in
San Francisco, a period of 44 days in all, being released
about August 3, 1947 (R. 16). He then returned to his em-
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ployment as a chair car porter for the Southern Pacifi1
Company and worked continuously until the 21st day o:
May, 1948, during which time his monthly earnings wer1
greater than they had been prior to the date of the acci
dent. He testified that prior to the accident his earning!
were- $218.00 per month plus tips, and after the accident hi!
earnings were $230.00 a month plus tips (R. 35). ThE
only qualification of the foregoing statement is plaintiff'!
testimony that after he started back to work the fore par1
of August and after he had made one round trip to Ogden,
he went to the hospital for one heat treatment of one hour
(R. 18).

With respect to plaintiff's hospitalization in May, 1948,
he testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Now, have you missed any work since going
back to work the second time? (The "second time"
refers to the one hour heat treatment he took after
having started back to work.)

A. Yes. I missed a couple of weeks here not
long ago. I was in the hospital on the 25th of last
month.
Q.

That would be May 25th?

A.

Yes.
Q. How long were you in the hospital on that
occasion?
·
A. Two weeks.
Q. Were you continuously in the hospital during that two weeks ?
A. Yes, I was in there for two weeks.
Q. Were you an "out" patient or in there all
that time?
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A.
~,-

In the hospital-no-no out patient.

Q. What were you in the hospital for, Mr.
Marshall?

A.

My injury.

Q.

The condition of your back?

A.

Yes.

Q. Were you receiving treatments of any kind
during that two weeks?

A.

Well, I was taking the same treatments.

Q.

Those heating-pad treatments?

A.

Yes.

Q. You were not, of course, able to work during that two weeks?

A.

No, I wasn't.

Q. Now, in addition to that two weeks have
you missed any other work?

A.

No, I didn't miss any other.
(R. 19)

On cross-examination he testified as follows:
Q. Mr. Marshall, you told Mr. Black that recently you were in the hospital?

..,~

~~

A.

Yes, sir ; I were.

Q.

And when was that?

A.

On May 25th.

Q.

Of this year ?

A.
Q.

Yes, sir.
And what hospital were you in?

A.

S. P. Hospital.

t
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Q. VVhereabouts?
A.

General Hospital, in San Francisco.

Q. And who was the doctor that was attendiDJ
you at that time?

A.

Dr. Merritt.
MR. BLACK : Will you spell that?

A.

Dr. M-e-r-r-i-t-t.

Q. I think you told us that you were ther1
continuously during the period of two weeks?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you were in bed?

A.

I was in bed._

Q. And since that time you have been work.
ing on your job?

A.

Yes, sir, I have.

Q. That is, the only time you have lost sinCE
the time you went back to work in the beginning oj
August has been these two weeks that you werE
in the hospital; is that right?

A.

That is true.
(R. 23, 24)

We would like to call the court~s attention to the fac1
that this testimony places the plaintiff in hospital confinement and in bed for a period of two weeks withill
four weeks of the time the trial was held in Ogden Jul,
1, 1948. Following the first trial and in support of defend·
ant's motion for a new trial, defendant's counsel filed hi!
affidavit and that of Dr. Russell J. Merritt, in which it wa1
set forth that the facts were not as testified to by thE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

plaintiff, but in fact, showed that the plaintiff had entered
the Southern Pacific Hospital on May 21, 1948 and was
there for a period of six days and during such time was
fully ambulatory, up and around the hospital at will, and
able to walk without any limp or list (R. 2nd Trial p. 151,
152, 153, 15-1). The plaintiff filed a so-called counteraffidavit in which he admitted the fact that he was only in
the hospital from May 21 to May 27, and admitted that he
was not "right down in bed," as he had testified, during his
hospitalization (R. 2nd Trial p. 155, 156). At the second
trial the plaintiff testified under oath on direct examination in conformity with the charge made by counsel for the
defendant in his affidavit and the affidavit of Dr. Merritt
on motion for a new trial, as follows:
Q.

Did you report back to the hospital?

A.

I did in May, 1948.

Q. Did you remain at the hospital continuously for any period of time in May of 1948?

A.

For six days.

Q. You testified at the previous hearing, didn't
you, Mr. Marshall?

A.

I did.

Q. What did you say at that time about the
time you were in the hospital?

~·

A. I said two weeks, but I was mistaken. It
seemed like a long time to me. I didn't count the
days.
Q. Did you check after the previous hearing to
see how long you had actually been .in the hospital?

A.

I did.
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Q. And after checking you discovered it was
six days?

A.

Six days.
(R. 26, 2nd Trial)

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS (SECOND TRIAL)

We think the statement of facts by appellant with
respect to the second trial so far as it goes is not inaccurate;
but in order for the court to properly consider the assignments of error made by plaintiff with respect to the second
trial we deem it necessary to supplement appellant's statement of facts as we consider it incomplete, particularly with
reference to the defendant's evidence.
Defendant's witness LeRoy Miller, who was the tractor operator, testified that he was moving south on the
platform pulling one baggage truck with the small gasoline
tractor shown in the photograph admitted in evidence and
contained in the record at Page 088. There was no load on
the baggage truck except one or two trash boxes as Miller's
part in servicing the train was to put trash boxes on the
various coaches. That as he came up to the point where the
plaintiff Marshall was standing he stopped the tractor
and asked the plaintiff to step out away from the cars;
that Marshall did not move from his position, but said:
"Come on boy, you got plenty of room"; that as he said this
he made a motion with his hands and Miller then said: "0. K.
watch out it might hit you" (R. 106, 109). That when he
started up the tractor was only two or three feet from
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Marshall (R. 113, 114). That it was customary for porters
standing by car steps with the step box down, to pick it up
and move over to the middle of the platform when a motor
and baggage truck proceeded along the platform by the
train (R. 109). That he was watching the plaintiff and
endeavoring to pull by him without hitting him with the
tractor or the wagon when the left front corner of the
wagon caught the right rear corner of the standing truck
(R. 110); that when this happened the rear end of the truck
which was being pulled skidded to the right, the right
corner thereof striking the coach. That Marshall could have
taken one step and been in between the ends of the cars
and in the clear but that he did not do so (R. 113, 118).
The defendant's witness Kenneth Malan, aged 22, testified that he was washing windows on Marshall's car and
was working five or six feet south of where plaintiff was
standing; that he was using a long-handled brush, to
which was attached a l/2 inch hose, water passing through
the handle of the brush, the hose trailing behind him on the
platform (R. 92, 100). That these small tractors when pulling iron-tired baggage trucks along the cement platform
make a lot of noise (R. 103, 104), and that he heard the
tractor coming down the platform. That the tractor stopped
when it was only two or three feet from where the plaintiff Marshall was standing (R. 93, 94). That when Miller
stopped the tractor he stepped off and moved the water
hose out of the way. Malan also stopped work to help move
the hose out of the way so, as he testified, "the tractor
would not run over it, because wheels cut the hose and
break it" ( R. 93) . That before Miller started the tractor
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up again he heard Miller and plaintiff talking; that he
could not remember all of the conversation but saw the
plaintiff step back and say something about there being
plenty of room (R. 95). That Miller then started up the
tractor and the two trucks cornered immediately ( R. 93, 94,
95). That the tractor moved only about five feet from the
time it started up until the two trucks cornered (R. 99).
Louis Stegge, a carman, was inspecting the train and
was on the platform a short distance north of where Marshall was standing when the tractor passed him. He testified that the tractor came to a stop and when it stopped
that he, Stegge, was then about two feet behind the back
end of the baggage truck, which would place him nine or
ten feet behind Miller, who was sitting on the tractor. He
also testified that he was about four or five feet behind the
truck when it stopped, which would place him about twenty
feet from Miller, who was sitting on the tractor (R. 126).
That he heard some conversation between the plaintiff
Marshall and Miller, the tractor operator, which he did
not understand, but he saw the plaintiff "move his hand for
him to come on" (R. 123). That Miller then started up the
tractor and had moved only four or five feet when the two
trucks cornered (R. 124). That the truck being pulled had
flat iron tires on the wheels four or five inches in width;
that they were smooth and that the platform is smooth;
that the tractor pulling a baggage truck with flat iron tires
makes "plenty of racket" coming along the cement platform
(R. 124). That the usual and customary practice among
porters in the long time he has observed them while working
around the depot platform at Ogden is to pick up the step
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box and step away from the train when tractors and trucks
move along the platform in servicing the train (R. 128).
In presenting respondent's brief to the court we are
content to limit our argument to the points discussed by
appell,ant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court exercised a sound and just discretion in granting defendant's motion for a new trial.

(a) The defendant was not guilty of "lack
of due diligence" in failing to present the newly discovered evidence at the first trial;
(b) Such evidence was material and of such a
nature as might change the outcome of the trial;
(c) Such evidence was not merely impeaching
evidence but was substantive evidence upon a material issue in the case.
II. The court committed no prejudicial error in granting defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 in view of the
evidence in the case.
III. The evidence warranted the submission of the
issue of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff to the
jury.

IV. There was no basis in the pleadings or evidence
warranting the submission of the case to the jury on the
theory of last clear chance and no error was committed by the
court in refusing plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3
thereon.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISE~ A SOUND AND
JUST DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
(a) The defendant was not guilty of "lack
of due diligence" in failing to present the newly discovered evidence prior to the trial.

It is a fact and the transcript of the proceedings at the
first trial so show (R. 103), that on May 15, 1948, Mr.
Bronson, counsel for the defendant, was present in the
office of Mr. Clifton Hildebrand, an attorney in Oakland,
California, and attended the taking of the deposition of one
Dr. Lloyd D. Fisher. Dr. Fisher was a witness for the plaintiff and, as disclosed by the record, had examined the plaintiff the preceding December for the purpose of enabling him
to testify. The deposition shows that the plaintiff was sent
to Dr. Fisher by his Oakland attorneys; that Dr. Fisher did
not examine him for the purpose of treating him, did not
prescribe for or treat him, but saw him on one occasion on
December 20, 1947 (R. 105, 110, 111). The affidavit of Mr.
Bronson in support of the motion for a new trial (R. 153,
2nd Trial) set forth the fact that he had, as of May 15,·1948,
fully investigated in San Francisco and found that there
had been no hospitalization of the plaintiff since August of
1947. The record fully discloses that the plaintiff had not
been hospitalized between the first part of August, 1947 and
the 21st day of May, 1948-six days after defendant's counsel was in Oakland and San Francisco investigating the

J
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facts of plaintiff's hospitalization. We would like at this
point to call the court's attention to the fact that the case
was then set for trial at Ogden, Utah, May 26, 1948. The
plaintiff having worked continuously from the beginning
of August, 1947 until May 15, 1948, the date defendant's
counsel investigated the matter of plaintiff's hospitalization,
and not having been hospitalized or received any medical
treatment during that period of time, we submit that it was
not reasonable for counsel to expect that between that date,
viz, May 15, 1948, and the date of trial, May 26, 1948, the
plaintiff would require hospitalization on, account of his
alleged injuries. The plaintiff went to the Southern Pacific
Hospital in San Francisco complaining of his back six days
after Mr. Bronson was in Oakland to take the aforesaid deposition and five days before the case was set for trial. In
view of the distance between Salt Lake City and San Francisco, we think that we were diligently trying to properly
take care of this lawsuit. We cannot, of course, discuss the
merits of the conflicting affidavits filed by counsel for the
plaintiff and defendant, plaintiff's counsel stating that he
advised Mr. Bronson of the hospitalization of the plaintiff
before trial, and defendant's counsel denying this. As plaintiff's counsel in his brief states, "It was within the discretion of the trial court to determine the facts as revealed by
the affidavits."
At page 34 of appellant's brief counsel says: "If counsel considered the hospitalization issue to be so vital to his
case why didn't he make a telephone call during or before
the trial? Why didn't he bring this matter to the attention
of the trial court? Why didn't he move for a continuance?
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Why should plaintiff be saddled with the onerous burden of
a new trial because of opposing counsel's inattention to his
case?" The simple answer to this is that while counsel for
the defendant was surprised at the plaintiff's testimony
that he had been in the hospital flat on his back in bed for
a period of two weeks between May 15th-the time counsel
was in San Francisco-and July 1, the date of the trial, defendant's counsel did not know and had no reason to suspect
that the plaintiff was falsifying about the matter. If we
correctly understand plaintiff's counsel, he contends that
this was inexcusable gullibility on the part of defendant's
counsel; that defendants counsel should have known or suspected the testimony was false, and should have made such
an investigation in San Francisco, California before the
close of the trial, which consumed less than two days, as
would enable defendant's counsel to either prove the falsity
of plaintiff's testimony or move the court for a continuance.
We invite the court's attention to the cases of Rath v.
Bankston, 281 P. 1081, and Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 P.
970, cited and discussed by appellant's counsel at page 32 of
their brief. These cases are cited in support of what seems
to be an argument to the effect that a "litigant at the trial
must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and
there." Counsel seems to advance the astounding proposition that perjury is permissible if you can get away with
it, that is, if counsel on the other side does not catch you in
it then and there, and be prepared to rise up and expose it,
and that unless it is exposed at the trial in which it occurs
the trial court must permit the verdict to stand even though
it was secured or may have been secured by false testimony,
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and that neither courts nor jurors nor litigants can find
protection from such an injustice by way of a new trial.
The cases above referred to and discussed on page 32' of
appellant's brief are not only not in point but they do not hold
what counsel says in his brief, at page 32, they stand for.
In the Rath case, which was an action for damages for personal injuries, it had been testified that it was impossible
to back a truck and trailer up to a certain curb. The trial
was recessed and during the recess the plaintiff conducted
an experiment with a truck and trailer similar to those involved in the accident and determined that it was possible
to back the truck and trailer to the curb at the point in question. The next day the trial was resumed but the plaintiff
did not put on this contradictory evidence although she had
a full opportunity to do so. It was held that this was not
newly discovered evidence entitling the plaintiff to a new
trial after an adverse verdict, for the simple reason that
the plaintiff had the evidence in her hands before the close
of the trial and full opportunity to present it.
In the Cohn case, which appellant herein cites for the
proposition which appellant himself italicizes as follows:
"A litigant at the trial must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there," suit was brought by way
of collateral attack upon a decree which had been obtained
by the prevailing party bribing a witness to perjure himself.
The decree had become final following appeal to the Supreme
Court of California. The following is what the court said
and what it held :
"The trial is his (the litigant's) opportunity for
making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails,
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being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he
likewise fails to show the injustice that has been
done him, on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy.

The wrong in such case, is, of course, a most grievous
one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts
would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised
that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally
determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice; and so the rule is that a final
judgment cannot be annulled merely because it can
be shown to have been based on perjured testimony;
for, if this could be done once, it could pe done again
and again, ad infinitum."
We submit that these cases relied upon by plaintiff's
counsel are not only not inconsistent with the position of
the defendant in this case, but support defendant's position.
(b) That the true facts with relation to plaintiff's
stay in the hospital as well as the time he was in the hospital was material and of such a nature as would probably
change the outcome of the trial cannot be doubted. It was
of the utmost importance in this trial to ascertain exactly
what the facts were with respect to any hospitalization
occurring just before the trial and nearly a year after the
accident, during which time plaintiff had never lost a day's
time from his work and earned more money per month than
before the accident. The importance of learning the true
facts was due to the fact that plaintiff was claiming that
he was permanently injured and was seeking damages in
the sum of $30,000.00 therefor. The importance to a jury
of a plaintiff being compelled to submit to an extensive
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hospitalization and medical treatment nearly a year after
the accident cannot be overemphasized. Any reasonable
man would be much more inclined to believe that the plaintiff's injuries were permanent if nearly a year after the
accident he was compelled to enter a hospital where he was
confined to his bed undergoing medical treatment, as plaintiff testified to, than if the true facts were made known,
viz, that the plaintiff went to the hospital for a checkup a
few days before the trial, was in' the hospital for a period
of six days, and was fully ambulatory during that time.
Plaintiff's counsel considered it of great importance and
the trial court in his order granting defendant's motion for
a new trial stated that he was taking "into consideration
the emphasis that plaintiff's counsel put on the plaintiff's
confinement for two weeks in the hospital." Whether it
was intentional or otherwise is immaterial in a proceeding
of this kind; the fact remains that the plaintiff himself
falsified on this important matter at the· first trial. He
admitted he falsified by the so-called counter-affidavit filed
in opposition to defendant's motion for a new trial. In his
testimony at the second trial, as set forth in the statement
of facts herein, he again admitted he falsified on this matter
at the first trial. The injury and the injustice to the defendant is the same whether the false testimony was given
intentionally or unintentionally. We further submit that
the evidence was of such materiality that the trial court in
the exercise of its discretion was warranted in assuming
that it would probably change the outcome of another trial,
and it may be that the fact that the outcome of the new
trial was changed is some indication of the materiality of
the evidence in question.
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(c) The evidence which the defendant offered to show
at a new trial, if granted, was not, as is contended by plaintiff's counsel, solely for the purpose of impeaching the
plaintiff. It of course would necessarily have the effect
of impeaching the plaintiff but it had the other characteristic of substantive evidence on a material matter. At the
second trial the very thing defendant's counsel said he
would prove, if given a new trial, was proved and it was
proved out of the mouth of the plaintiff himself upon his
direct examination by his counsel. (See Statement of Facts,
supra.)
We concede the general rules with relation to motions
for new trials cited by counsel, viz, that a new trial should
not be granted on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
if such evidence merely goes to impeach a witness, and that
a new trial should not be granted in the exercise of a sound
discretion unless there is some reasonable basis for supposing that the newly discovered evidence will change the outcome. But the newly discovered evidence in this case was
substantive evidence upon a material point in addition to j·,.
being impeaching evidence. At the second trial, antici- .
pating counsel for the · defendant would be prepared to
establish the true facts with relation to the plaintiff's hospitalization, plaintiff's counsel brought out the facts as a
part of his main case during his direct examination of the
plaintiff. We do not see how he can now contend that the
evidence was merely impeaching evidence. We submit that
the court under all the circumstances was acting well within
its discretion in holding that the· defendant's counsel had
not been guilty of lack of due diligence; that the evidence :~
'~,
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was material and such as would probably alter the outcome
of another trial.

It appears from all the evidence in the case that the
plaintiff lost a total of 50 days on account of this accident,
44 days immediately following the accident in 1947, and 6
days the latter part of May, 1948. The jury awarded him
$500.00 special damages, which was substantially in excess of what he lost in wages in accordance with the true
facts. At the second trial Marshall testified on cross as
follows:
Q. And then you were an out patient for an
additional time and the total time was 44 days?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you didn't draw any money during that

time?
A.

I did not.

Q. How much would your wages amount to for
that period?

A.

44 days. $350.00

An additional six days time would not bring his lost
wages up to as much as $400.00. In view of the nature of
the injury plaintiff actually suffered and the time he lost,
the trial court undoubtedly considered that awarding the
plaintiff general damages in the sum of $8,000.00 was excessive and was perhaps greatly influenced by the fact
that the jury most likely considered the plaintiff to have
rather serious permanent injuries because of their belief
that he was in a hospital flat on his back for two weeks
nearly a year after the accident. Under the circumstances,
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it is easy to believe that the trial judge felt that he could
not effect justice in the case by reducing the verdict inasmuch as the entire case was tainted and affected by the
false testimony given.
It was a matter largely within the discretion of the

trial court as to whether or not he would grant a new trial
in this case. It is now for this court simply a question of
law as to whether or not the trial court abused that discretion and the burden is upon the appellant in this case to
clearly establish that the trial court did abuse its discretion. This court has on several recent occasions had this
question before it for review. In the case of Moser v. Zion's
Co-op. Mercantile lnst., Utah - , 197 P. (2) 136,
Mr. Justice Wolfe reviewed most of the early Utah cases
treating the subject and said:
"It is a matter now too well settled to admit of
any serious dispute that the question of granting
or denying a motion for new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial court. White v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 8 Utah 56, 29 P. 1030;
Van Dyke v. Ogden Savings Bank, 48 Utah 606, 161
P. 50; Utah State National Bank v. Livingston, 69
Utah 284, 254 P. 781; Thompson v. Bown Live
Stock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651; Jensen v. Logan
City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2d 708. This rule applies
whether the motion is based upon insufficiency of
the evidence or upon newly discovered evidence.
See cases above cited and Valiotis v. Utah-Apex
Mining Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; and Trimble v.
Union Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 P. 2d 674.
This court cannot substitute its discretion for that
of the trial court. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414,
117 P. 1068, 2 N. C. C. A. 782. We do not ordinarily
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interfere with rulings of the trial court in either
granting or denying a motion for new trial, and unless abuse of, or failure to exercise, discretion on the
part of the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the
ruling of the trial judge will be sustained. Lehi
Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, et al., 4 Utah 327, 9 P. 867;
White v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., supra; Utah State
Bank v. Livingston, supra; Clark v. Los Angeles
& S. L. R. Co., 73 Utah 486, 2.75 P. 582; and Trimble
v. Union Pacific Stages, supra. See also Harrison
v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 161, 47 P. 1019,
1020."
The Moser case was followed later by State v. Cooper,
-Utah-, 201 P. (2) 764, without additional discussion
of the question.
The latest decision of this court upon the matter is the
case of Dwight L. King, Administrator of the Estate of
Wendell 0. Jorgensen, Deceased, v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, decided as recently as December 13, 1949, in which
the general principles relating to the granting of new trials
was again reviewed by Mr. Justice Wolfe. Any further research or discussion of the law applicable to the question
here involved would be superfluous.
POINT II
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN
GRANTING DEFENUANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 IN VIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
IN THE CASE.
Appellant concedes that defendant's Requested Instruction No. 7 is a correct abstract statement of the law,
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but that the giving thereof was not warranted by the evidence in the case. The usual and customary practice, according to the testimony of the witness Louis Stegge, who
had for a long time worked on the platform at Ogden, Utah,
was for porters to pick up their step box and step over to
the center of the platform where they would be in line
with the steel posts holding up the umbrella sheds when
tractors pulling baggage trucks came moving along the side
of the train ( R. 120) . The tractor operator, LeRoy Miller,
who had been operating a tractor on this platform for three
and a half years likewise testified that such was the usual
custom and practice of chair car porters (R. 109). It does
not appear from the evidence that the reason Miller stopped
the tractor was because Marshall was standing by the coach,
but because he did not want to run over the water hose.
However, before he started up he testified that he asked
Marshall to step· out away from the cars, which in and by
itself indicates that it was the usu3:l and customary thing
to be done and that Miller expected it of Marshall. Instead
of stepping out, Marshall said: "Come on boy, you got
plenty of room," and made a motion for Miller to come
ahead (R. 106, 109, 123). Miller himself had certain duties
to perform in connection with the servicing of the train,
viz, to get the trash boxes on the cars, and so he then proceeded to pull forward approximately five feet before the
trucks cornered. It is quite obvious that What Miller endeavored to do when he saw that Marshall, even after being
requested, was not going to move from his position, was to
pull to the left in an effort to give Marshall as much clearance as possible, and it was this action on his part that undoubtedly caused the trucks to corner. Miller testified that
1
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he was watching the plaintiff endeavoring to pull by him

without hitting him with the tractor or the wagon at the
time the left front corner of the truck caught the right rear
corner of the standing truck (R. 110). It is thus apparent
that Marshall could have taken three steps forward and
been absolutely in the clear or he could have easily stepped
on his step box and onto the first step of his coach and
likewise have been in the clear.
In view of the testimony with respect to the custom
and practice of porters moving out a way from the train
when tractors and trucks came along, which was something
the jury had a right to believe, as well as the fact that it
would appear from the physical facts alone that there was
some danger in standing between the coach and a moving
tractor and trailer, we think the instruction was warranted.
Appellant says that the only danger in standing against
the car would be in the event that the tractor operator
was negligent. The custom and practice did not so indicate
nor do the physical facts so indicate. Appellant's statement
is not a fair statement for the reason that accidents sometimes happen without negligence on the part of anyone.
Nor is it a conclusive answer in this case for the reason
that as this is not an Employer's Liability case contributory
negligence of the plaintiff is a complete bar to recovery.
Plaintiff had worked as a chair car porter for a considerable time and he knew, or he should have known, that there
was some danger attendant to his maintaining his standing
position against the car and that he would be in an absolutely safe position if he took three steps, which would carry
him to the center of the platform. This was not a case where
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the tractor was moving and the plaintiff would have to jump
for it, as the tractor was standing still and before it was
started up he was requested by Miller to move and undoubtedly had plenty of time and full opportunity to do so. If the
instruction is carefully read in the light of the foregoing
we think it will be made clear that it was properly given.
The instruction is a fair and accurate statement of the law
-not slanted in defendant's favor in the least, actually
amounts to no more than a detailed instruction on contributory negligence, and cannot therefore have been prejudicial in any event for the reason that the contributory
negligence of the defendant was an issue which was properly submitted to the jury.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAR~ANTED THE COURT'S
SUBMISSION OF THE ISSUE OF THE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF TO
THE JURY.
Much of what was said in the argument under Point
II has a bearing upon the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. In arguing this matter to the court,
appellant's counsel again falls into the error of saying:
"Furthermore, Marshall was entitled to assume that Miller
would operate the jitney and truck in a careful and prudent
manner. Marshall was under no obligation to anticipate
that Miller would be negligent in operating the vehicle."
This may well be true, but in view of the custom and practice of porters moving away from the train when tractors
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and trucks are passing, together with what seems to be an
inherently dangerous thing, i. e .• to stand between a coach
and a moving tractor and truck when it is not at all necessary
to do so, Marshall should have known that an accident might
happen or that he might in some way be injured by standing against the coach, even though Miller was himself not
negligent in moving the vehicle. The undisputed testimony
was that these gasoline tractors when pulling an iron-tired
baggage truck on a cement platform make a lot of racket.
The window washer, Kenneth Malan, heard the tractor
coming a considerable distance away. Even if the plaintiff's
testimony that he never saw the tractor and truck or heard
it until it was just even with him, incredible as this seems,
is to be believed, it would be sufficient to raise the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
in not seeing and hearing what he should have seen and
heard.
The jury in this case had a right to believe that the
tractor stopped two or three feet from where Marshall was
standing, as testified to by every witness in the case who
saw the accident, excepting the plaintiff himself, and had
the further right to believe the testimony that before it was
again started up Miller, the tractor operator, asked Marshall to move; that Marshall refused to move and instead
said: "Come on boy, you got plenty of room," at the same
time motioning Miller to come ahead. There can be no question but there was at least two, and possibly three, places
Marshall could have stepped to where he would be absolutely
safe--the center of the platform, the car steps, or between
the cars-and that he had ample time to do so. There was
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ample evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury,
entitled them to believe that the plaintiff was guilty of
negligence proximately contributing to the accident, which~
would bar recovery, and they were entitled to an instruction on contributory negligence and the court committed no
prejudicial error in giying the same.

POINT IV
THERE WAS NO BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE OR
PLEADINGS WARRANTING THE SUBMISSION
OF THE CASE TO THE JUR.Y ON THE THEORY
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND NO ERROR WAS
COMMIT·TED BY THE COURT IN REFUSING
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3
THEREON.
We have no quarrel with plaintiff's statement and
definition of the doctrine of last clear chance, or with the
cases cited in support thereof. It is not necessary, however,
to go back to the case of Davies v. Mann, as this court in the
case of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, and on petition for
rehearing at 109 Utah 365, has in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Wolfe very clearly and in great detail set out the meaning
and the manner of the application of this doctrine. Considering this question in the light of any given set of facts,
however, it should be borne in mind, as was said in Thomas
v. Sadlier, 108 Utah 552, 162 P. (2d) 112, that if the situation is such that to reasonable minds there is doubt as to
whether the "second party" had time to avoid the accident,
the matter should not be submitted to the jury, otherwise
there is grave danger of permitting the one really at "fault
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to shift the blame for the accident on the other by the accentuation of the other's duty to avoid the effect of the
first one's negligence." I have borrowed the foregoing
from Mr. Justice Wolfe's opinion on application for rehearing in the Graham case, supra.
The question then is, at what point of time did the duty
that Miller, the tractor operator, had to exercise ordinary
care devolve upon him under the doctrine of last clear
chance? According to plaintiff's position it was at any time
that Miller observed the plaintiff standing against the
coach where he had no business to be when a moving tractor was approaching along the platform. On this phase of
the case plaintiff's counsel admits and contends, as he must,
that the plaintiff Marshall had negligently placed himself
in a position of danger which he maintained up to the point
of the accident. The question now is, what should Miller, the
tractor operator, have done to discharge his duty?
There is no evidence whatever in the record that Miller
was required to stop or that it would be negligence merely
for him to proceed past a porter who failed to step into the
clear in violation of the usual and customary practice and
procedure under the circumstances. For the purpose of
argument, let us concede that Miller had the duty, as plaintiff contends, to exercise reasonable care t~ avoid striking
the plaintiff as he stood against the car and that such duty
arose as soon as Miller saw the plaintiff in a position potentially hazardous. Assuming this, there is not one shred of
testimony or evidence in the record to indicate that Miller
was not exercising ordinary care to avoid striking the plaintiff. We are, of course adopting in this discussion what
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seems to us the incredible testimony of the plaintiff that
the first time he heard or saw or in any way observed the
tractor was when it came past him at a speed faster than he
could walk. If there is any basis at all for plaintiff's contention that he was entitled to an instruction on the doctrine
of last clear chance, it can only be on account of such testimony. But if we accept plaintiff's testimony
in this regard
i
the only thing in the evidence that might indicate the manner in which Miller was driving the tractor that would throw
any light on whether or not he was exercising ordinary care
to avoid the consequences of the plaintiff's negligence, was
the fact that he pulled farther to the left in an effort to
clear the plaintiff as much as possible, and that he was
pulling out to the left of what otherwise would have been
his line of travel in an effort to avoid any possibility of injury to the plaintiff. It was this effort on the part of Miller
which resulted in the cornering of the two trucks. It cannot be said that from and after the instant the trucks cornered Miller had a last clear chance. The accident occurred
at the moment the trucks cornered. As· was said in the
Graham case, supra, "The opportunity to avoid the accident
must not be a mere possibility, but a clear opportunity."
From and after the instant the trucks cornered, Miller was
powerless to avoid any further consequences.
No jury would have been warranted in finding Miller
negligent in the manner he operated the tractor along the
platform, assuming again that they believed plainitiff's version of the accident, either because of the speed plaintiff
testified to or the fact that Miller did not stop. There was
no evidence in the record whatsoever that the speed at which
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plaintiff said the tractor was operated, or the failure to
stop was negligence; and negligence from the speed and
the failure to stop alone cannot in anywise be inferred. At
any rate, the speed and the failure to stop was no evidence
that Miller was not exercising due care to avoid the possibility of injury to the plaintiff occasioned by his own negligence. Ordinary men-jurymen-are prone to conclude
"after the event" that the conduct involved was negligent
and to do so merely because an accident happened. It is a
device that is "worked to death" by personal injury lawyers
and trial courts should not, as was said in the Sadlier case,
supra, shift the blame for the accident by submitting the
issue of last clear chance, unless there is evidence of negligent conduct shown. And the conclusion that there was a
failure to exercise the care that a prudent person should
to avoid the consequences of the other party's negligence,
should be uninfluenced by the fact that an accident ·happened.
The attempt to inject into this case the theory of "last
clear chance" is strictly an afterthought on the part of
plaintiff's counsel. Neither the plaintiff nor defendant
tried this case upon any such theory. We will concede that
if the parties proceed to try a case upon a certain theory
that neither side should thereafter complain because it was
not pleaded, nor for any other reason, but in this case it
was simply a question as to whether plaintiff's theory as
set forth in his complaint and on which he tried it was to
be believed, in which case it was liability, or whether the
jury was to believe the defendant's version as to how the
accident happened, in which case it was not liability. _Let
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us look at the complaint. The negligence charged in paragraph IV was as follows :
(a) That defendant failed to keep a proper
lookout in operating the tractor;
(b) That defendant operated the tractor at
an excessive rate of speed;
(c) That defendant failed to keep the tractor
under safe, proper and immediate control.
(R. 002)
The plaintiff went through two trials and never deviated from or enlarged upon the foregoing allegations of
negligence. T'o this day no pleading or anything else can be
found in the file indicating that the plaintiff entertained
the theory or would urge that he was, on account of his own
negligence, in a position of peril and oblivious thereto and
the defendant was or should have been aware of the danger
and should have, but failed to, exercise ordinary care to
avoid- the consequences of plaintiff's negligence. But that
is the theory that plaintiff's counsel now says the case should
have been submitted to the jury on.
The very first indication that plaintiff embraced such
. theory was when following the trial he submitted the requested instruction here at issue. The case was in such
shape when it went to the jury that under the evidence and
the instructions they were able to and undoubtedly did fully
consider both the plaintiff's and defendant's version as to
how the accident happened and returned a verdict accordingly.. Plaintiff elected to and did try this case on the theory
that the defendant was negligent and that he was free of
contributory negligence. The defendant iried it on the theory
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that it was not negligent and that the plaintiff was guilty
of negligence, and the plaintiff was fully warned by the
pleadings that such would be the defense. The plaintiff
was not entitled under all the circumstances, without pleadings or warning of any kind, to attempt to "shift the blame
for the accident on the defendant by accentuating defendant's duty to avoid the effect of his own neglect." Thomas
v. Sadlier, supra. We submit that no error was committed
in failing to inject the issue of last clear chance into the case
under all the circumstances, and if error was committed
it was not prejudicial.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the trial court committed
no error and was exercising a sound, judicial discretion in
granting defendant's motion for a new trial, and that no
prejudicial error was committed in granting defendant's
Requested Instructions No. 7 and No. 11, or in refusing
plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3.
Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
Counsel for
Defendant and Respondent.
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